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Hi.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant/appellee Karen Bednarik disputes plaintiff/appellant Mary Ann WernerJacobsen's standing to bring the appeal. The order being appealed joined Werner-Jacobsen as a
party under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There is no requirement that the party to be
joined must be given notice of the motion to join. Cf

Patano v. Clark Equipment Co., 139

F.R.D. 40, 42 (S.D.N. Y. 1991) (motion to add new party under Rule 14, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, not required to be served on proposed new party). The only parties that must be
given notice are those in the case. Id. Once the motion to join is granted, then the new party
must be served and has an opportunity to move to quash service or file a motion to dismiss. In
fact, Werner-Jacobsen was served, filed a motion to quash and a motion for reconsideration. R
246-252, 267-268. Accordingly, Werner-Jacobsen would only have standing to appeal when the
district court rules on her motion to quash/reconsider.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court abused its discretion under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, when it added Werner-Jacobsen as a party in order to insure that full equitable relief
could be granted in connection with Bendarik's efforts to collect past due child support from her
ex-husband. See Ludlow v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Ct. App.
1995) ("Ordinarily, we will not disturb a trial court's Rule 19 determination absent an abuse of
discretion.") (citing to Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah App. 1989), affd sub
nom. Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990)).
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2.

Whether the district court properly applied the "alter ego" doctrine to Werner-

Jacobsen, the new spouse of Bendarik's ex-husband, where Bednarik has alleged that assets of
her ex-husband are being hidden in the name of Werner-Jacobsen in order to frustrate Bednarik's
ability to collect past due child support. See Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990) (as to
issues of law, appellate court reviews for correctness without according deference to the district
court)
3.

Whether the district court's ruling may be supported on the alternative ground

that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -13 (Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act) Bednarik's
ex-husband has fraudulently conveyed assets to his new wife, Werner-Jacobsen, thus making
Werner-Jacobsen an indispensable party to the underlying action to recover past due child
support. See Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990) (as to issues of law, appellate court
reviews for correctness without according deference to the district court)
4.

Whether the district court's ruling may be supported on the alternative ground

that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1, which states that stepparents are obligated to
support their stepchildren, Bednarik may pursue the assets of Werner-Jacobsen to collect past
due child support that has accrued since Werner-Jacobsen married Bednarik's ex-husband. See
Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990) (as to issues of law, appellate court reviews for
correctness without according deference to the district court)
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Preservation of Issues
Bednarik expressly referred to Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as the basis for
her Motion to Join Party [Werner-Jacobsen] and Amend Petition for Modification. R 120.
Bednarik provided detailed analysis of the "alter ego" issue in her Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Join Party and Amend Petition for Modification. R 121-131. These issues have been
preserved.
Bednarik asks the Court of Appeals to consider two grounds not raised below upon which
the district court's decision to join Werner-Jacobsen may be affirmed: (1)fraudulentconveyance
and (2) stepparent's statutory support obligation. The Court of Appeals may do so under the rule
in Utah that an appellate court may affirm on any proper grounds, even if not raised below. See
Indian Village Trading Post v. Bench, 929 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah App. 1996) (affirming district
court's order of dismissal on grounds not raised below); BeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444
(Utah App. 1995) (same); but cf. State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 355, n. 3 (Utah 1996)
(acknowledges inconsistency of prior opinions but most recent opinion cited by court allows
affirmance based upon argument not raised below).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer - Claim arising before or after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor,
whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
49716.1
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* * *

(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may be given,
among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the
transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been
sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent
to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made
or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was
incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1. Duty of stepparent to support stepchild - Effect of termination
of marriage or common law relationship.
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that a natural or adoptive parent is
required to support a child. Provided, however, that upon the termination of the marriage or
common law relationship between the stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive parent the
support obligation shall terminate.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bednarik generally agrees with the Statement of the Case prepared by Werner-Jacobsen
with the following exceptions. Werner-Jacobsen indicates that she was not served with the
Motion to Join Party and Amend Petition for Modification. This is true. However, as noted
above, Bednarik was not required to provide notice to her, only to the current parties to the
action. The other exception pertains to Werner-Jacobsen's observation that the district court did
not make detailed findings of fact. The district court was not required to do so. Bednarik's
motion to join Werner-Jacobsen did not seek a conclusive finding of liability against WernerJacobsen but rather was in the form of a request to amend Bednarik's pleadings in order to join a
new party.

Because this was a pleading issue, as opposed to a bench trial (which would

necessitate findings of fact, see Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) it should be treated as
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Under this rule, Bednarik's
allegations in the fact statement of her Memorandum in Support of Motion to Join Party and
Amend Petition for Modification must be taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to
her. See Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Utah 1996). Accordingly,
Bednarik repeats those allegations (R 121-124) in her Statement of Facts.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Dennis N. Jacobsen was ordered to pay child support of $150.00 per month in

1981 and then ordered to pay child support of $75.00 per month per child commencing April 23,
1993.
2.

Jacobsen has continually failed to pay his ongoing child support obligation and

owes Bednarik substantial sums for child support arrears.
3.

Bednarik obtained a judgment against Jacobsen for child support arrears on May

5, 1992 and said judgment totaled $17,199.93, plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum
accruing from the date of entry of the order.
4.

Jacobsen has failed to satisfy this judgment or even make payments towards the

outstanding judgment.
5.

That since the parties divorced in 1981, Jacobsen has known of his ongoing child

support obligation and purposefully took actions to avoid the payment and collection of such
court ordered obligations.
6.

Jacobsen has avoided his child support obligation from the first month he was

ordered to pay it. As seen from the judgment obtained in 1992, Jacobsen failed to pay child
support from July 1, 1981 through March 31, 1992. Jacobsen not only failed to pay the ongoing
child support obligation as outlined, but has also failed to pay on this judgment since it was
obtained by Bednarik.
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7.

That since the judgment was entered Jacobsen owed child support for thirteen (13)

months at $150.00 per month for a total of $1,950.00 and child support for thirty-four (34)
months at $75.00 per month for a total of $2,550.00. To date Jacobsen has paid $2,235.00 and
still owes $2,265.00 in current child support arrears plus the outstanding judgment.
8.

Jacobsen married Mary Ann Werner on June 14, 1990.

9.

That since his marriage to Mary Ann Werner-Jacobsen, Jacobsen has hid all of his

assets and income in the name of his new wife.
10.

That the parties purchased a home on November 14, 1991 which they live in

together, however, the home is titled solely in the name of Mary Ann Werner.
11.

That the parties own many vehicles, including numerous taxi cabs. Jacobsen

himself attached the titles of seven (7) vehicles to his Answer to the Order to Show Cause, all of
which are solely in the name of Mary Ann Werner-Jacobsen. That the only vehicle which the
parties own which is titled in the name of Jacobsen is a vehicle with a lienholder which cannot be
taken for collection of child support.
12.

That all of the Jacobsen's bank accounts are solely in the name of Werner -

Jacobsen. The few times Bednarik has received child support payments from Jacobsen over the
last few years, all of the bank accounts are in Werner - Jacobsen's name alone.
13.

Jacobsen maintains that all of the taxi cabs mentioned above and income

generated from the cabs belongs exclusively to his wife. Jacobsen continues to make such a
claim in spite of a newspaper interview which he gave in the summer of 1995 in which he was
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quoted as saying he makes $200 to $300 a day driving cabs and that "he owns four taxis, leasing
cars to other drivers through Yellow Cab."
14.

Jacobsen continues to make this claim in spite of having business cards with his

name, number and the name and number of Yellow Cab. This business card was given to the
parties' minor son by Jacobsen himself in January of 1996.
15.

That by maintaining this position and shielding all of his income and assets in the

name of Werner-Jacobsen, Jacobsen has thus far insured that he does not have a salary which can
be garnished and does not own assets which could be surrendered or sold to collect for child
support arrears.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court acted within its discretion when it joined Werner-Jacobsen.

Her

presence is necessary in order for Bednarik to obtain complete relief in this action. Because
Werner-Jacobsen is alleged to be assisting Jacobsen in hiding his assets, it is proper to treat her
as his alter ego. Likewise, it is appropriate to bring her into this action on the grounds that she is
alleged to have received fraudulently conveyed assets from Jacobson. Under both the alter ego
and fraudulent conveyance theories, Bednarik does not seek to collect against the separate assets
of Werner-Jacobsen. Rather, Bednarik seeks to establish the amount of funds that Jacobsen has
improperly transferred to Werner-Jacobsen and obtain a judgment against Werner-Jacobsen for
up to that amount. Lastly, the district court's decision can be affirmed under Utah statutory law
which provides that stepparents are obligated to support their stepchildren. Under this theory,
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Bednarik is entitled to recover past due child support that has accrued since Werner-Jacobsen
married Jacobsen.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Joining Werner
-Jacobsen Under Rule 19.

Pursuant to Rule 19(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] person who is subject to
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot
be afforded among those already parties,...." Without Werner-Jacobsen in this action, Bednarik
will not be able to obtain a judgment against Jacobsen's assets that have been hidden in WernerJacobsen's name. Likewise, to proceed against Werner-Jacobsen based upon her statutory duty
of support as a stepparent, Werner-Jacobsen must be joined. As such, the district court acted
within its discretion and has prevented the result of forcing Bednarik to bring a separate, but
clearly related action, against Werner-Jacobsen. See Landes, 795 P.2d at 1130 (purpose of Rule
19 is to avoid multiple litigation and possibility of inconsistent judicial determinations).
Furthermore, as noted in Section III below, courts have found that an alleged transferee of a
fraudulent conveyance, like Werner-Jacobsen, is an indispensable party in an action to collect
against the fraudulently conveyed property.
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II.

The Alter Ego Theory Supports the Joinder
This Action.

of Werner-Jacobsen in

Bednarik acknowledges that the "alter ego" theory has typically been applied to
corporations, not individuals. However, a "key feature of the alter ego theory is that it is an
equitable doctrine requiring that each case be determined upon its peculiar facts." Salt Lake City
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah App. 1988). Some courts have
extended the alter ego label to non-corporate entities. In one case, the court applied the "alter
ego" label to two trusts that an ex-husband had used to hide assets from his ex-wife. LaBow v.
LaBow, 537 A.2d 157, 167 (Conn. App. 1988) (affirming trial court's modification of original
alimony award based, in part, upon ex-wife's evidence that ex-husband had failed to disclose
assets in the trusts at the time of the divorce action). In another case, the court actually applied
the "alter ego" label to an individual. Burwell v. Neumann, 37 A.2d 640 (Conn. 1943). The
Burwell court ruled that the driver of a car that was involved in an accident was the "alter ego"
of the owner and, thus, the owner could be held liable for the driver's actions. 37 A.2d at 642.
The facts alleged by Bednarik support extension of the alter ego theory to WernerJacobsen in this case. Werner-Jacobsen is alleged to be an active participant in an effort by her
husband, Jacobsen, to improperly shield his assets from Bednarik by placing them in WernerJacobsen's name. If Bednarik is able to prove this allegation at trial, she will have met the key
elements of the alter ego doctrine: (1) as to certain assets, the alleged separate ownership by
Werner-Jacobsen is a sham, and (2) sanctioning the continued use of Werner-Jacobsen's name as
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a shield against Bednarik would lead to an inequitable result, i.e., Jacobsen would not be held
accountable for his child support obligation.
In Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted a two-prong test in regards to the alter ego theory: "(1) there must be
such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one or a few
individuals; and (2) the observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote
injustice, or an inequitable result would follow." This doctrine has been used by courts to
disregard the legal distinction of titles held in the name of a corporation rather than a shareholder
when such names were being used to perpetuate an injustice on third parties. The veil of
protection invoked by a name or title will be pierced when a legal entity is "used to perpetrate a
fraud, to justify a wrong, or to defeat justice." Dockstader v. Walker. 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah
1973).
In discussing the first prong of this test, courts have recognized that sometimes the
creation and use of a separate legal entity is a well thought out scheme and in fact one individual
is actually conducting business behind the legal shield of the name of another. In Lyons v.
Lyons, 340 So.2d 450, 451 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976), the Court stated that "[a] court of equity looks
through form to substance and has often disregarded the corporate form when it was fiction in
fact and deed and was merely serving the personal use and convenience of the owner."
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In the instant case, Jacobsen is hiding behind the separate legal entity of his wife's name
in an effort to avoid child support orders and judgments against him. Jacobsen has the equitable
benefit of residing in the home with his current wife, even though the title is in her name alone.
Jacobsen has the equitable benefit of using the automobiles he shares with his current wife, even
though the titles are in her name alone. Jacobsen, who has no banking accounts, has the
equitable benefit of using the banking accounts of his current wife, his child support obligation
has been paid out of them. Jacobsen has the equitable benefit of the taxi cab business, even
though the titles to the cabs and business are in Werner-Jacobsen's name alone. Jacobsen hands
out business card with his name and number and the business name and number. Drivers who
drive the cabs owned by Werner-Jacobsen maintain that it is Jacobsen with whom they deal and
to whom they pay their daily fees. Jacobsen was quoted by the Salt Lake Tribune in the summer
of 1995 saying that he owned four taxi cabs and leased cars to other drivers through Yellow Cab.
Werner-Jacobsen was not mentioned in this interview. Although Jacobsen has carefully made
sure that every legal title is in the sole name of his current wife, he is still receiving the equitable
benefit of such assets, including the taxi cab business.
The second element of the alter ego test is that the observance of the form would sanction
a fraud, promote injustice or an inequitable result would follow. Courts have also stated that
,f

[t]he [alter ego] test's second prong is addressed to the conscience of the court, and the

circumstances under which it will be met will vary with each case." Messick v. PHD Trucking
Serv., Inc., 678 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1984). In the instant case, if Jacobsen is allowed to continue
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hiding assets and income in the name of his current wife, he will not be held responsible for his
support obligations. It is evident that Werner-Jacobsen condones and participates in Jacobsen's
scheme as she has signed and provided all of the necessary titles and paperwork to shield
Jacobsen's assets and income. Accordingly, it was appropriate to join her as a party in this action
based upon the alter ego doctrine.
III.

The District Court's Joinder of Werner-Jacobsen Can Be Affirmed on the
Basis That She Has Received Fraudulently Conveyed Property.
The district court's decision can be affirmed on the alternative theory of

fraudulent conveyance. The allegations pled by Bednarik in support of her motion to join
Werner - Jacobsen satisfy the elements of a fraudulent conveyance. Bednarik has alleged that her
ex-husband, Jacobsen, has purposely transferred assets into the name of his new wife in order to
frustrate her efforts to collect past due child support. These allegations satisfy the requirements
under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(1 )(a) that the transfer be made "with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor." Subsection (2) of this statute lists factors that
should be considered in determining the issue of actual intent. Bednarik's allegations support the
following factors: (1) the transfer was to an insider, Jacobsen's wife, (2) Jacobsen is alleged to
have retained possession or control over the taxicab business, cars and checking accounts that are
in his new wife's name, and (3) the transfers took place after Jacobsen had been ordered to pay
child support and judgments were obtained against him. Utah Ann. Code § 25-6-5(2)(a), (b) and
(d).
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The Iowa Supreme court affirmed a fraudulent conveyance finding against a wife where
her husband had transferred assets into her name in order to frustrate the ability of the husband's
judgment creditors to collect. See Benson v. Richardson, 537 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1995)
(affirming judgment of over $500,000 against wife and imposition of constructive trust on real
property where evidence established that husband transferred his income into accounts held in
his wife's name, husband paid on mortgage on real property held in his wife's name and husband
set up corporation owned exclusively by his wife in order to funnel his income through
corporation, all of which were done to frustrate the collection efforts of creditors ). As in the
Benson case, Bednarik's ex-husband has frustrated her collection efforts by hiding his income
and business in the name of his wife, Werner-Jacobsen.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that where an ex-husband was alleged to have
fraudulently conveyed assets to his new wife, the new wife was an indispensable party in the exwife's action to reach those assets. Johnson v. Johnson, 572 P.2d 925, 926-27 (Nevada 1977)
("Cases decided prior to the adoption of FRCP 19(a) hold that a transferee is an indispensable
party in an action to set aside the conveyance of the transferred property, (citations omitted) To
enter an order of reconveyance without joining the transferee would constitute the taking of
property from one person and giving it to another without a hearing.") Applying this rule here,
the district court's order was not only proper, it was required before Bednarik could attempt to
collect against Werner-Jacobsen based upon the fraudulent conveyance theory.
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IV.

The District Court's Joinder of Werner-Jacobsen Can Also Be Affirmed
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1 Which Imposes A Duty of Support Upon
Stepparents.

The State of Utah has imposed a duty of support upon stepparents. Utah Code Ann. § 7845-7.1. Although a stepparent's income cannot be considered in calculating the amount of child
support, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.4, the income and assets of a stepparent can be reached to
satisfy any back support obligations that have accrued since the stepparent married the obligor
ex-spouse. See generally Ball v. Peterson 912 P.2d 1006, 1013 (Utah App. 1996) (noting that
Utah statutory law "requires stepparents ... to support their stepchildren.")

Accordingly,

Werner-Jacobsen can be joined in this action based upon her duty as a stepparent to support her
stepchildren.
CONCLUSION
By bringing Werner-Jacobsen into this action, Bednarik has not sought to ignore WernerJacobsen's separate existence or deny her any fundamental rights. Bednarik's purpose is to hold
Werner-Jacobsen accountable to the extent that Bednarik's ex-husband has hidden his assets in
Werner-Jacobsen's name. Also, the State of Utah has imposed a duty on stepparents to support
their stepchildren.

Because Bednarik's ex-husband has not satisfied his duty of support,

Bednarik is entitled to collect from Werner-Jacobsen past due child support that has accrued
since she became a stepparent. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion to
join Werner-Jacobsen under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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